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Representing 21.6 percent of southern New England’s housing stock, small multifamily (SMF) proper-
ties (defined here as two- to four-unit properties) are vital to the supply of affordable rental housing 
in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Connecticut.1 From Q1-2005 through Q1-2009, 74.1 percent of 
SMF properties in southern New England were purchased by owners intending to occupy one of the 
units (“owner-occupants”); another 25.3 percent were purchased by investors living outside the prop-
erty. Analyzing and comparing the borrowing trends of these owner-occupants and investors in the SMF 
property market reveals that investors may not engage in as much risky behavior as public sentiment 
leads one to expect. In fact, our analysis shows that owner-occupants have riskier borrower characteris-
tics and take out riskier mortgage products than their investor counterparts.
Not surprisingly, investors prefer purchasing SMF properties over single-family properties. Having 
multiple units in a property allows investors to collect rent from several different occupants, reducing 
the risk of vacancy losses and providing better cash flow. Figure 1 illustrates the more significant role of 
the investor in small multifamily properties than in the single-family market.2 
SMF properties provide housing for many people in low- and moderate-income (LMI) communities 
throughout southern New England, as Figure 2 illustrates. This concentration of SMF properties in LMI 
ZIP codes likely reflects the makeup of the neighborhoods’ housing stock, including a large share of 
historic “triple-deckers.” Starting in the late 1800s, SMF proper-
ties helped recently immigrated, working-class families to buy 
property for themselves and rent out additional units, frequently 
to  relatives.3  The  differences  across  neighborhoods’  housing 
stock may also reflect the active policy decisions in non-LMI 
communities, where zoning laws explicitly and implicitly restrict 
the  construction  of  affordable,  multifamily  housing  and  the 
conversion of single-family properties for multifamily uses.4
Recent public opinion and public policy favor rescuing strug-
gling  owner-occupants  while  excluding  investors  facing 
similar  difficulties.  When  President  Obama  announced  the 
$75  billion  foreclosure  prevention  package,  he  responded  to 
public sentiment by highlighting that the program would help 
only  owner-occupied  homes  and  not  speculative  investors.5 
Likewise, regional programs, such as the “90-Day Right to Cure” 
in Massachusetts, deliberately exclude investors from receiving 
government assistance.6 No one wants to reward the specula-
tive behavior that was common among investors in California, 
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Figure 1: Investors Purchase More 
Small Multifamily than Single-Family Properties
Source: LPS Applied Analytics.
Note: For southern New England first-lien purchase loans originated between 
Q1-2005 and Q1-2009, excluding second homes. Calculated by the Federal 
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Florida, Arizona, and Nevada and fueled the real estate bubble. However, according to mortgage data 
provided by major servicers, that cowboy approach to real estate was not as common in southern New 
England. 
A common misperception of investors is that, compared with owner-occupants, they have “less skin 
in the game,” worse borrower characteristics, and are more likely to foreclose on a property when the 
market drops.7 Figure 3 compares investors’ and owner-occupants’ characteristics at loan origination 
and identifies investors as having better credit quality and taking on less risk than owner-occupants.8 
The prima facie explanation for this phenomenon is that, on the whole, SMF property investors are 
simply better qualified than owner-occupants. 
Another explanation for investors’ stronger characteristics could be that investors face stricter loan 
underwriting criteria in the secondary market than their owner-occupant counterparts. Servicers explain 
that these differences stem from the perception that investors have less emotional attachment to their 
properties and, as a result, have a greater potential for negative consequences. Conclusions drawn from 
Figure 3 must also take into account that the data have better coverage of servicer loans than portfolio 
loans. Also, these data exclude loans that investors may turn to if they are denied conventional mort-
gages, such as private loans and those from “hard money lenders.” 
In addition to owner-occupants having riskier borrower 
characteristics, they also use riskier mortgage products 
more commonly than investors to purchase SMF prop-
erties. Figure 4 illustrates that subprime loans were 
used in comparable proportions among investor and 
owner-occupant purchasers of single-family properties. 
However, subprime mortgage products are used far 
more commonly among owner-occupant purchasers 
of SMF properties than investors. 
Anecdotes from owner-occupant purchasers of SMF 
properties reveal that some buyers are being “upsold” 
by realtors who downplay the risk of SMF ownership.9 
In recent interviews, first-time buyers explained they 
began their home searches looking for single-family 
homes, but were then convinced by mortgage brokers 
Figure 2: Small Multifamily Homes Make Up a 
Significant Portion of Purchases in LMI Communities 






Source: LPS Applied Analytics.
Note: For first-lien purchases originated between Q1-2005 and Q1-2009. LMI ZIP codes = ZIP 
codes where the median income is less than or equal to 80% of the state's median income. 
Data represent ZIP codes in RI, MA, and CT. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
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The main source of data for this article is Lender Processing Services Inc.’s Applied Analytics (LPS), for-
merly known as McDash. The LPS database covers around 70 percent of the entire mortgage market of 
southern New England, especially loans administered by large servicers, and approximately 75 percent of 
the prime securitized mortgage market. However, LPS has limited coverage of the subprime market. First 
American LoanPerformance (LP) data from nonagency securitized pools are also used. The LP database 
captures about 70 percent of the subprime securitized mortgage market with limited coverage of the 
prime market. 
This article uses the dataset with the best coverage ratio and, when necessary, consolidates the two data-
sets to ensure sufficient coverage. The data are first-lien purchase loans and therefore do not include 
second-lien and refinance loans. The mortgage origination data do not represent the total property stock 
for a given year. For chart 1, a low- and moderate-income (LMI) ZIP code is defined as a ZIP code where the 
median income is at or below 80 percent of the state median income. For the purposes of this article, we 
focus on Q1-2005 through Q1-2009 data. For our foreclosure petition analysis, we focus only on borrowers 
who received petitions between Q1-2005 and Q1-2009 for first-lien purchase loans originated in 2005.10  Community Developments
or realtors—on the basis of rental income and the perception 
that home values would continually increase—to purchase more 
expensive SMF properties. As owner-occupants buy beyond their 
budget, they become riskier borrowers and rely more heavily on 
riskier subprime mortgage products.
An unambiguous indicator of increased risk and overstretched 
budgets is the percentage of owner-occupants receiving foreclo-
sure petitions. Figure 5 shows, by loan type, the percentage of 
investors and owner-occupants who received foreclosure peti-
tions. Other than single-family prime loans, across other product 
and  property  dimensions,  owner-occupants  who  purchased 
properties  in  2005  received  a  higher  percentage  of  foreclo-
sure petitions than investors. The significant share of petitions 
received by subprime mortgagees also stands out for owner-
occupants. In fact, for loans originated in 2005, over one-third 
of  owner-occupants  (35.4  percent)  with  subprime  mortgages 
on SMF properties received at least one foreclosure petition by 
March 2009. For prime loans, more than twice the percentage 
of owner-occupants who bought SMF properties received fore-
closure  petitions  (8.7  percent)  compared  with  single-family 
properties (4.0 percent).
Another  indication  of  owner-occupants  being  more  vulner-
able and overstretched financially than investors is the speed 
with which they receive their first foreclosure petitions. Figure 
6 shows, by state, the length of time between origination and 
the first foreclosure petition for owner-occupants and investors. 
Rhode Island has the biggest disparity, as the median time it 
takes for an owner-occupant to receive a first foreclosure peti-
tion is 229 days earlier than for an investor.
Contrary to public opinion, mortgage data from Q1-2005 through 
Q1-2009 illustrate that owner-occupants have riskier borrower 
characteristics, take out riskier loans, have greater numbers of 
foreclosure petitions, and move more quickly into foreclosures 
than investors. However, limitations of the datasets may make 
it difficult to draw conclusions for the market overall. Further 
research could explore alternative lending channels and eval-
uate the differences between owner-occupants and investors as 
landlords of SMF properties. While the data may capture some 
differences in loan underwriting, the comparison of owner-occupants and investors is compelling. The 
results underscore the importance of informing lenders and the public on the actual risks associated 
with small multifamily properties. Overall, the emotional attachment of being an owner-occupant does 
not negate the increased risks of less stringent underwriting criteria nor the risks associated with the use 
of subprime lending products.
Figure 4: Subprime Loans 
are Most Common Among Owner-Occupants 
of Small Multifamily Properties
Source: LPS Applied Analytics(LPS) and First American LoanPerformance(LP).
Note: We consolidated the prime loans from LPS with the subprime and 
alt-a loans from LP. Each bar in the above chart displays the percentage 
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Figure 3: Investors in Small Multifamily 
Properties Have Less Risky Borrower 






Loan Amount $217,600  $244,800 
LTV Ratio 70 78.26
DTI Ratio 39 41
FICO Score 720 688
Source: LPS Applied Analytics 
Note: Underwriting indicators are median values at time of first-lien 
purchase loan origination from Q1-2005 through Q1-2009 in RI, MA, 
and CT. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
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Endnotes
 1Small multifamily housing represents just one-tenth of housing units 
nationwide. Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Connecticut are the three states 
with the highest shares of housing units in SMF properties, with 25.2 percent, 
23.0 percent, and 17.8 percent, respectively, 2000 Census. While these first 
statistics focus on the housing stock, the remainder of the article is concerned 
with the flow (purchases) of properties..
 2The investors’ market share may even be underrepresented in this chart 
as a result of some banks keeping investor loans in their portfolios rather than 
selling them on the secondary market.
 3Abby Goodnough, June 20, 2009.
 4Jenny Schuetz, July, 2006.
 5Michael A. Fletcher and Renae Merle, February 19, 2009. President 
Obama said further, “[This foreclosure prevention plan] “…will not rescue the 
unscrupulous or irresponsible by throwing good taxpayer money after bad 
loans.”
 6The 90-day right to cure in Massachusetts is found in Chapter 206 of the 
Acts of 2007. 
 7Alan Zibel, October 26, 2008.
 8While this dataset is mainly prime loans, these findings are consistent with 
prior Federal Reserve Bank of Boston research on subprime loans by Kai-yan 
Lee, May 20, 2008. Further investigation of the LP data confirms that owner-
occupants are also much more highly leveraged than investors for subprime 
mortgages. The mean combined loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for owner-occupant 
purchasers of SMF properties is 97.2 compared with 91.2 for investors. These 
figures demonstrate the extent to which subprime owner-occupants must 
stretch themselves financially to purchase small multifamily properties.
 9Hannah Thomas, July 23, 2009.
Figure 5: Foreclosure Petitions are Most Common Among 
Owner-Occupants of Small Multifamily Properties
Source: LPS Applied Analytics for prime loans and First American LoanPerformance (LP) for 
subprime loans in RI, MA, and CT, see data box. 


















Figure 6: Owner-Occupants Receive Foreclosure 




Source: LPS Applied Analytics
Note: Median days between date of mortgage origination in 2005 and date of first 
foreclosure petition for borrowers who received petitions. Calculated by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston.
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